CRIM 434 University of South Florida Terrorism As Organized Crime Reflection Paper My topic is; Terrorism as organized crime must write a 4-5 page reflecti

CRIM 434 University of South Florida Terrorism As Organized Crime Reflection Paper My topic is; Terrorism as organized crime must write a 4-5 page reflection paper based on material from the text and classroom lecture. The paper should be double spaced, size 12 (Times New Roman Font) and must be in APA format. I attached the pages from the book that you need to write this paper, please I do not want any PALAGRISM WORK CHAPTER
Terrorism as Organized Crime
Compare and contrast international and domestic terrorism incidents
Understand the ways in which some types of terrorist activity relate to organized crime
Describe some of the more prominent terrorist organizations
Understand the political, social, and financial motivations of terrorist groups
On May 1, 2010, a dark blue 1993 Nissan Pathfinder sport utility vehicle with dark tinted windows entered Times
Square, New York, at approximately 6:28 P.m. It parked on a tourist-crowded block at the eastern corner of 1 Astor
Plaza, near the entrance to the Minskoff Theatre. About 2 minutes later, a T-shirt vendor noticed smoke drifting
from the vehicle, which was parked with its emergency flashers on. The vendor alerted a nearby NYPD police
officer, who then approached the vehicle to investigate and observed smoke coming from vents near the back seat,
unidentified canisters, and the smell of gunpowder. The officer immediately called for backup, a bomb disposal
team, and the New York City Fire Department.
An area stretching from 43rd Street to 49th Street on Seventh Avenue and 45th Street from Seventh Avenue
to Eighth Avenue was quickly evacuated of all vehicles and foot traffic, and the area was barricaded. Several build-
ings near the vehicle, including the New York
Marriott Marquis hotel, in front of which the Pathfinder was parked,
were also evacuated. The vehicle was set ablaze, but did not detonate.
vehicle and explore its contents. Inside, they found in the rear of the vehicle two alarm clocks with batteries that appar-
Upon arrival, the bomb disposal team used a remote-controlled robotic device to break out a window of the
ently were fashioned as triggering devices, connected by electrical wires to two full five-gallon cans of gasoline, sand-
wiching 40+ consumer-grade M-88 firecrackers inside a 20-ounce metal container (wrapped in duct tape, with its end
Temoved), gunpowder, three 20-gallon propane tanks, and a green metal gun locker pressure cooker holding 8 bags
mation on the contents indicated that the design of the device was more consistent with that of an incendiary device
with approximately 250 pounds (113 kg) of urea-based fertilizer and 120 M-88s. A bomb disposal expert with infor-
than that of a traditional bomb. The improvised explosive device’s ignition source failed to set it off as intended.
On May 3, 2010, federal agents arrested Faisal Shahzad, a 30-year-old Pakistani-born resident of Bridgeport,
Kennedy International Airport, but was arrested before the plane taxied from the gate. He admitted his role in the
Connecticut, who had become a U.S. citizen in April 2009. He had boarded Emirates Flight 202 to Dubai at John F.
attempted bombing and said that he had trained at a Pakistani terrorist training camp.
306 Chapter 9 . Terrorism as Organized Crime
According to the New York Times, Shahzad implicated himself and gave information
authorities after his arrest. Seven or eight people were arrested by Pakistani officials in connection
with the plot.
The Times Square bombing attempt is another of many such attempts by would-be terrorists
on American soil
. As of the preparation of this text, it is not yet known to what extent Shahzad’s
attempt was at the behest of any specific larger criminal organization.
Most acts of terrorism have three basic participants: the perpetrator, the victim, and the audience
affected (or the target). Although the perpetrator often is difficult to identify, the victim of the
attack is usually the most controversial. The issue of terrorism is clouded because it is commonly
viewed as a form of low-intensity, unconventional aggression on the lower end of the warfare
spectrum. In this unrealistic view, terrorism is an act of war rather than a criminal activity which
gives it a purpose and some sense of dignity. However, most people recognize that embassy bomb-
ings, political hostage taking, and aircraft hijackings are criminal terrorist acts. Accordingly, they
understand that such acts are designed to shock and stun and are outside the warfare conventions.
This chapter discusses terrorism as a part of the examination of organized crime. Some will
argue that because many terrorist acts are politically or ideologically motivated, they do not qual-
ify as a form of organized crime. Although this is partially true, the authors suggest that political
agendas and profit motivation can be concurrent causes of many acts of terrorism. In 1986, the
President’s Commission on Organized Crime defined what constitutes an organized crime group.
Because many terrorist acts are committed by persons working in a group with a designated
leader or a division of command and with a certain amount of social support, perhaps many ter-
rorist groups can accurately be termed organized crime groups. For example, Peru’s Shining
Path, which has an estimated 4,000 to 5,000 members, has controlled the coca leaf-growing fields
for years to generate revenue to support its national political agenda. Similarly, many early anti-
Castro Cuban refugee groups in the United States engaged in illegal acts, such as running gam-
bling syndicates, importing cocaine, and committing extortion as a means of funding their
political agendas. It could also be argued that the origins of the Southeast Asian heroin traffic can
be found in the Cold War policies of the United States and its allies of providing logistical support
and military aid to the many Kuomintang warlords of the Golden Triangle in an attempt to con-
tain the influence of the Chinese communists.
Whether domestic or international, terrorism is pervasive throughout the world and remai
s one of
the most complex and difficult issues facing law enforcement in the twenty-first century. Much like
the term organized crime, there is no single, universally accepted definition of the word terrorism.
The Federal Code of Regulations defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of force and vio-
lence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population,
or any segment thereof, in furtherance of social or political objectives” (28 CFR, Section 0.85). In
comparison, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI 2010) offers a more
definition addressing both domestic and international terrorism:
Domestic terrorism: the unlawful use, or threatened use of force by a group or individual,
based and operating entirely within the United States without foreign direction, committed
any segment thereof, in furtherance of social or political objectives.
International terrorism: violent acts or acts that are a danger to human life that are a
violation of the criminal law of the United States or any state or that would be a criminal viola-
tion if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or any state. These acts appear to
be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a government
Chapter 9 . Terroristn as Organized Crime 307
by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of government by assassination or kidnap-
ping. International terrorist acts occur outside the United States or transcend national bounda-
ries in terms of the means by which they are to be accomplished, the persons they appear
intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which the perpetrators operate or seek asylum.
The literature of terrorism has been closely associated with the word guerilla, which can be
defined as “little war.” Georges-Abeyie (1983) distinguishes the two by suggesting that terrorist
groups have a more urban focus, usually attack innocent civilians and property, and operate in
small groups or bands of three to five persons.
In many ways, terrorism is easier to describe than to define. Essentially, it is the unlawful use
or threat of violence against persons or property to further political or social objectives. It is
designed to intimidate or coerce a government, individuals, or groups to change their behavior or
policies. The National Institute of Justice (1995) reported that state and local law enforcement
organizations believed that terrorism was more widespread than official FBI statistics indicated. In
fact, many agencies characterized neo-Nazi, antifederalist, animal rights, environmentalist, and
antiabortion groups as terrorist groups. It becomes apparent that organized crime groups that
have the wherewithal and commitment to practice terrorism possess a unique criminal resource.
Terrorist tactics take many forms: hostage taking, aircraft piracy, sabotage, assassination,
hoaxes, and indisc nate bombings or shootings. Ironically
most victims of terrorist acts have little
to do with either causing or satisfying terrorists’ grievances. The bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah
Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995, could be considered a terrorist act that, at least
from a perpetrator’s standpoint, represents the epitome of success. In addition to killing 168 people,
including 19 children, and instilling considerable public alarm, it attracted immense publicity to the
terrorists themselves and their cause. We will take a closer look at the Oklahoma City bombing later
in this chapter. Another unprecedented terrorist act in Tokyo, Japan, also took place in 1995. Mem-
bers of a religious cult group used lethal nerve gas in the city’s commuter train, killing 12 people and
injuring thousands. These events are just two of many recent terrorist incidents that have occurred
around the world. Since 1987, terrorist attacks, mainly by Middle Eastern groups, have left more than
400 Americans dead on American-owned properties abroad (Cooper 1995b).
The political and social circumstances that lead to the creation of terrorist groups vary widely
around the world. Persons who carry out such acts vary in age, race, and cultural background. In
1986, the President’s Task Force on Combating Terrorism (PTFCT) reported that an estimated 60
percent of the Third World population are under 20 years of age and half are 15 years or younger.
This being the case, a volatile mixture of youthful aspirations coupled with economic and political
frustrations tends to create a pool of possible terrorists in those countries. Today’s terrorists have a
deep-seated belief in the justice of their causes. They are tough and cunning and have little regard
for their lives or the lives of others. Terrorists’ weaponry often comes from the illegal international
arms market and could originate with legitimate arms vendors, which are, to a great extent, unregu-
lated. Through their expansive organizational structure, many terrorists have the ability to acquire
timely information on potential targets and the security precautions for these targets. If governmen-
tal pressures become more effective against them, terrorists will simply focus on easier targets.
Terrorists can be a part of a large organization or can act with only a few persons who share
similar beliefs. Examples of large terrorist organizations are the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF),
which has an estimated 300 members operating among three factions. The Abu Nidal Organiza-
tion (ANO) boasts a membership of 500 and has an international theater of operation. Many
terrorist organizations have memberships in the thousands. White (1991) points out that most
groups have a membership of fewer than 50 people; under a command element, which
usually consists of a few people, the group is divided according to specific tasks. For example,
Intelligence sections are responsible for accessing targets, support sections provide the means to
Ists are probably less likely to use nuclear devices
than chemical weapons and least likely to use biological weapons. But difficulties can some-
times be overcome, and the choice of weapons will, in the end, depend on terrorists’ specialties
and access.
Society has become vulnerable to a new kind of terrorism in which the destructive power of
both the individual terrorist and terrorism as a tactic is infinitely greater. Previously, terror-
ists killed kings or high officials, but others, only too eager to inherit their power, quickly
stepped in. However, the advanced societies of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries
depend on the electronic storage, retrieval, analysis, and transmission of information. A
country’s national defense, local police, banking, trade, transportation, scientific research,
and a large percentage of the transaction records of government and the private sector are
now online. This exposes enormous vital areas of national life to sabotage by any computer
hacker, which could render a country unable to function, resulting in the growing concern
about infoterrorism and cyberwarfare.
Laqueur (1997) has suggested that with $1 billion and 20 knowledgeable hackers, a single
terrorist could shut down the United States. There is little secrecy in the wired society and protec-
tive measures have proved of limited value, as illustrated by teenage hackers’ penetration of highly
secret systems in many fields. The possibilities for creating chaos are almost unlimited now and
vulnerability will almost certainly increase in the twenty-first century.
Terrorists’ targets are also changing. For example, why assassinate a politician or indis-
criminately kill innocent people when a planned attack on electronic switching can produce a far
more dramatic and lasting result? For instance, the switch at the Culpeper, Virginia, headquarters
of the Federal Reserve’s electronic network, which handles all federal funds and transactions,
would be an obvious place for a modern-day infoterrorist to hit. If the new terrorism directs its
energies toward information warfare, its destructive power will be considerably greater than any
it wielded in the past.
The ability of states and societies will most likely be of less interest to terrorists of the future
than to ordinary criminals and organized crime. Electronic thieves, whether engaged in credit
card fraud or industrial espionage, are part of the system, using it rather than destroying it. After
all, its destruction would cost them their livelihood. This takes us well beyond terrorism as we
have known it in the past. New definitions and new terms may need to be developed for new
realities and intelligence services, and policy-makers must learn to distinguish among the various
forms of terrorists and their emerging motivations, approaches, and goals.
To what extent does terrorism exist today and how will it change in the years to come? The
answers to questions such as these are difficult because of the ever-changing complexion of ter-
rorists themselves and their causes. In general, however, several observations can be made with
regard to the nature and extent of terrorism today.
On September 11, 2001, the specter of international terrorism became devastatingly clear to all
Americans. Two hijacked airliners slammed into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in
New York killing more than 2,800 people. On the same day, a third hijacked airliner crashed into
the Pentagon in Washington, DC, and a fourth crashed in Pennsylvania before reaching its target.
The attack was allegedly coordinated by al Qaeda, a fundamentalist Islamic terrorist group led by
Osama bin Laden operating out of Afghanistan under the protection of the Taliban regime that
controlled the country (Zunes 2001). Much has been written about the specific events of that day,
but for our purposes, the important points to be emphasized are that (1) large-scale international
terrorist attacks had, for the first time, occurred within the borders of the continental United
Chapter 9 . Terrorism as Organized Crime 309
terrorists can benefit by receiving government assistance in arms or explosives, communications,
travel documents, and safe havens for training operatives. Their actions are frequently difficult to
trace, so the governments involved can maintain respectability and legitimacy in the international
community while secretly financing and supporting terrorist activities to achieve their goals.
Revolutionary terrorism involves persons whose guerrilla-like tactics invoke fear in those
holding political power and their supporters. The goal is to overthrow the current power base and
replace it with political leaders who share the terrorists
‘ views. Common tactics used by revolu-
tionary terrorists are kidnappings, bombings, and assassinations, all of which are skillfully
designed to force the existing government to respond with repressive measures. The terrorist then
uses media coverage in an attempt to expose the government as being inhumane and in need of
being overthrown. Examples of revolutionary terrorism are Mao Tse-tung’s takeover of China
from Chiang Kai-shek and Fidel Castro’s successful takeover of the Cuban government from the
Batista regime during the late 1950s.
These five forms of terrorism by no means represent all the forms that exist throughout the
world. White (1991) points out that being defined as a terrorist is often a function of the per-
ceived moral rightness of the factions involved. For example, are groups who use force and vio-
lence to overthrow a dictatorship revolutionary terrorists or freedom fighters? Is the employment
of violence against a government’s murderous policies justifiable self-defense or is it nationalistic
terrorism? These areas are murky because each group involved believes that the use of violence to
achieve its particular political end is justified under the circumstances.
Since the early 1900s, terrorists’ motivations, strategies, and weapons have changed to some
extent. The anarchists and the left-wing terrorist groups that succeeded them, such as the Red
Armies that operated in Germany, Italy, and Japan in the 1970s, have vanished and the extreme
right has now adopted the initiative. However, most international and domestic terrorism is nei-
ther left nor right, but ethnic-separatist in nature. Ethnic terrorists have more staying power than
ideologically motivated ones because they draw on a larger reservoir of public support.
Perhaps the most notable change in recent decades is that terrorism is by no means the
militants’ only strategy. Historically, groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the Palestinian
Hamas, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Kurdish extremists in Turkey and Iraq, the Tamil
Tigers of Sri Lanka, the Basque Fatherland and Liberty movement in Spain, and many others have
had both political and terrorist wings from the beginning.
The political arm provides social services and education, runs businesses, and contests elections;
the military wing engages in ambushes and assassinations. This division of labor has clear advantages.
The political leadership can publicly disassociate itself when the terrorist component commits a par-
ticularly outrageous act or when something goes wrong. The claimed lack of control can be real,
because the armed wing tends to become independent; the men and women with guns and bombs
often lose sight of the movement’s wider goals and can end up doing more harm than good.
Terrorist operations have also changed somewhat, because airline hijackings have become
increasingly rare. Hijacked planes cannot stay in the air forever, and few countries today are will-
ing to let them land. Toward the end of the twentieth century, the trend was moving away from
attacking specific targets (such as the other side’s officials) and toward indiscriminate killing.
Furthermore, the dividing line be…
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